Staying Out of Sight:
Concentrated Policing and Local Political Action

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In many communities, field interrogations are a major source of friction between the police and minority groups… the friction caused by 'misuse of field interrogations' increases 'as more and more police departments adopt aggressive patrol in which officers are actually encouraged, routinely, to stop and question persons on the street.'
--Earl Warren's opinion in Terry v. Ohio

Within America's urban communities today, different neighborhoods are marked by vastly different policing regimes.[1] In some pockets of the urban space, police presence is minimal. Interactions between citizens and police are rare, and when they occur it is generally in response to a clear and anomalous threat, or a request for assistance from individuals seeking aid. By contrast, in other areas, the infrastructure of surveillance—from police substations to squad cars to policemen descending through their buildings in vertical patrols—is a pervasive part of the architecture of community life. In these neighborhoods, citizens may regularly encounter the police in their daily routines, through involuntary and largely unwelcome interactions.

The frequency of police stops of citizens for questioning, known as stop-and-frisk (or "Terry stops" after *Terry v. Ohio*), has mushroomed in recent years. In New York City from 2002 to 2011, police stops saw a spectacular increase from just 90,000 to almost 700,000, a whopping 603 percent. In Philadelphia from 2005 to 2009, stops increased 148 percent to approximately 250,000.[2] This increase has not substantially raised the "hit rate," however; the proportion of stops resulting in arrest has remained fairly stable over time at about five percent. In addition, not all communities bore equal witness to this development. Rather, the practice of stop-and-frisk unfolded in a specific spatial pattern; neighborhoods characterized by concentrated poverty and large concentrations of minority residents were the disproportionate sites of growth in police activity.

Recently described as a "tale of two cities," these disparate patterns of policing have important consequences for citizens' orientations toward law enforcement. In the most heavily

policed places, “no snitching” codes and distrust of authority, as well as a host of other regularized behaviors, have become widely-held adaptations to targeting and surveillance. Kids are taught by their parents, as one writer notes, to “not antagonize the police, don't run in public, never walk with both hands in your pockets.”[3] They may be told to always carry identification, avoid certain styles of dress like hooded sweatshirts, and to get a “bag and a receipt” when leaving stores. Adults, too, may adapt their comings and goings to avoid triggering police attention. Indeed, they may learn to avoid certain types of seemingly innocuous behavior for fear of seeming suspicious: “If I go back to my building in the morning because I forgot my bus pass, they are on you with, ‘Why did you go into that building and back out again?' Or if I walk outside to check the weather and go back in, it's the same thing.”[4] In short, in some neighborhoods, law enforcement monitoring is intricately woven into community norms and behavioral adaptations.

The meaning of this bifurcation of urban space is clearly displayed in these vivid anecdotes exchanged among community members, and in these warnings handed down from parents to children is reflected the important consequences of these patterns for citizen-police relations. Our concern here, however, is somewhat broader. In this paper, we examine the consequences of aggressive policing for the willingness of citizens to call upon government to help resolve problems in their neighborhoods. Specifically, we ask: what are the consequences of the increased use of Terry stops, and their concentration in disadvantaged neighborhoods, for whether communities engage with the state? How has the greater provision of police surveillance in some communities altered these spaces as sites of collective agency?

In this paper, we contend that police activity is an important determinant of political participation at the community level. Our main argument is that residing in communities with a

greater incidence of police interventions educates citizens about government and incentivizes avoidance behavior. Specifically, we ask whether citizens who reside in neighborhoods marked by particularly forceful policing practices come to see local governing institutions as arbitrary, harmful, and untrustworthy. In turn, these residents may become less likely to register problems with government, less likely to make claims with local agencies, and more likely to "stay below the radar." Thus, residents in these communities may not just close themselves off to cooperation with police, but to government institutions more broadly. In sum, we investigate whether police surveillance and adversarial citizen-police contact has a chilling effect on neighborhood level outreach to local government.

To assess this idea, we rely on a novel measure of local citizen engagement, nonemergency calls for service or information. In studies of mass politics, civic engagement and participation are most frequently operationalized as whether an individual participates in elections; talks about politics with their family and friends; actively participates in community groups; phones or writes their elected representatives in office; turns up at a protest or rally; or gets involved in political campaigns by donating money or volunteering time. These have all been measures regularly collected by the American National Election Studies and other standard surveys concerned with political behavior. While these measures are clearly important, however, we argue that they miss a vital aspect of the citizen-government relationship, and overlook a far more common form of participation at the local level: seeking out municipal government to solve immediate problems in one's community. In this paper, we rely on a novel measure of civic engagement at the community level – non-emergency requests for service, or 311 calls in New York City from 2010 to 2012.

New York City's 311 call centers are "centralized government public information entities

charged with taking nonemergency service requests from citizens."[5] Local governments began implementing 311 as a way to relieve emergency calls to 911, but they soon expanded beyond taking non-emergency police and fire calls to become a way of streamlining all municipal services into an integrated system of city services, a 'one-stop shop' to help citizens navigate complex local government bureaucracies. A technology that quickly became popular among those in public administration who advanced the concept of constituent-focused management, 311 was viewed as a way of connecting citizens to their municipal government, increasing government responsiveness, and increasing citizen confidence in the public sector. By bridging the gap between constituents and government, 311 call centers would improve citizen knowledge and engagement in local issues and promote more efficient response to citizen needs. As one report noted, 311 can "increase the level of trust citizens have in their government, make government more accessible and accountable, and make the community a more attractive place to work and live."[6] Thus, local governments began implementing 311 not only as a means of relieving overburdened 911 lines, but as a way to foster government accountability, improve the reputation of government in citizens' eyes, and "improve citizen access to municipal services."[7] For example, 311 was central to Philadelphia's campaign to rid city politics of corruption and foster citizen confidence, and was seen as a "counterweight" to the "old Philadelphia—a place where getting municipal service seemed to require having the right friends, calling a ward leader, or making a campaign contribution."[8] The idea caught on and by 2008, almost a hundred counties and cities in the United States were operating 311 call systems. Today, according to a survey of local governments, 15 percent have adopted a 311 call system and 27 percent were considering developing such a system; an array of large cities, including Chicago, San Antonio, Miami, Los Angeles, Baltimore, Austin, Houston, Charlotte and Washington, DC, as well as

many smaller jurisdictions have adopted 311.[9]

This indicator serves as an important proxy for citizen-initiated contact with local government. Based on a unique dataset of nearly 1.3 million police stops of citizens in New York City and over 3 million calls to 311, we analyze variation in government contact by aggregating calls and stops to the census block group/month level. We find that, across both time and space, the character of community policing has significant and negative consequences on levels of political action at the local level.

The implications of our findings are many, but we are especially concerned with two. First, police stops have become an integral part of residential life in many under-resourced communities. To the extent that the concentration of surveillance activity reduces engagement with government, these practices have become one dimension of further disadvantage in communities. By reducing political empowerment, police stops have become an important aspect of neighborhood political ecology. Second, higher levels of alienation inhere not just in individuals who have direct contact with criminal justice authorities, as our previous work suggests,[10] but in whole communities. The spillover effects of living in a hyper-policed area may mean that the political consequences of punitive criminal justice policies have an impact not only on their intended targets, but also on the law-abiding residents of certain locales.

Criminal Justice and Community Political Life

Our aim in this paper is to expand on an emerging generation of research, which has suggested that criminal justice policies are altering the civic practices, social capital, and political disadvantage of entire communities. In particular, previous work has noted that neighborhoods where many men now cycle in and out of prison each year, criminal justice interventions may

erode the ability of whole neighborhoods to maintain community ties, participate in the political process, and ultimately, to achieve collective ends. The "collateral damage to African American communities," one scholar argues, "cannot be captured by aggregating individual effects."[11]

Recent data on incarceration document this geospatial pattern. Numerous studies have documented enclaves of incarceration; prisoners are largely concentrated in cities, certain communities within those cities, and even particular neighborhood blocks. Consider, for instance, where prison inmates call home. One-third of prisoners return to just one county in Michigan, eighty percent of whom are residents of Detroit, and 41 percent reside in just eight zipcodes.[12] In Texas, seven neighborhoods in Houston receive more returning prisoners than several entire counties in the state of Texas. Almost three-quarters of the entire population of prisoners in New York State came from just seven community board districts (of over 50 board districts in the city).[13] And in Virginia, most inmates return to the city of Richmond, of whom half are located in just fifteen percent of the census blocks in that city. In Chicago, while many areas were largely "untouched" by the increase in incarceration rates, one study found increasing concentrations in "a dense and spatially contiguous cluster of areas in near-west and south-central Chicago that have rates of incarceration some eight times higher (or more)," patterns not explained by differences in crime alone.[14]

Preliminary evidence suggests that these high levels of incarceration have a dampening effect on trust and community ties. The collective removal and return of large numbers of people from neighborhoods to prisons disrupts social networks; as Todd Clear explains: "when intimates are removed to prison, people often respond by isolating themselves in ways that undermine norms of cooperation and mutual support."[15] By cycling community members in and out of homes and neighborhoods, families and other social groups are destabilized, making it more

difficult to maintain internal social resources, and to socialize and monitor youth. Thus, in communities where incarceration is concentrated, criminal justice interventions may alter the social capital of entire neighborhoods by fueling disorganization and diminishing collective efficacy, defined as "the ability and willingness to take joint action for the common good."[16] At the same time, removing residents quickly alters the density of social networks, reducing the capacity of networks to "link to resources outside the neighborhood and to bring them to bear on problems" in the neighborhood, an effect that itself "weakens attachment to the neighborhood and ties to neighbors."[17]

Others scholars go even further, suggesting that concentrated incarceration can actually hinder public safety in communities through a reciprocal dynamic. Concentrated incarceration removes sources of economic sufficiency and destabilizes social structures[18] The social disorganization that results weakens the normal functioning of informal social controls, which serve as an important check against crime and violence. Thus, over-incarceration may actually foster heightened criminality, as confidence in law enforcement declines and legal cynicism increases.[19] Moreover, because of the constant cyclical flow of residents, a neighborhood's pro-social networks and sense of generalized trust and cooperation are eroded and replaced with 'negative' social capital (i.e. gang ties exported to communities from prison).[20]

In addition to undermining social organization, criminal justice encounters can diminish communities' political influence. Most directly, criminal justice policies reduce political participation through felon disenfranchisement laws that exclude felons and/or ex-felons from the franchise. However, it may also diminish political engagement in other ways, both for those who have direct contact with the punitive state and for their family members and neighbors. Consider a recent study by Traci Burch. Using geospatial analysis of voting registration records

and neighborhood-level data on convictions in Atlanta, Georgia, she found that "sending neighborhood residents to prison suppresses voter registration not only among inmates, but also among the family, friends, and neighbors they leave behind."[21] And because voting rates are expected to be already low in these communities, incarceration shapes the mobilization activities of external political actors, making it "less likely that parties, campaigns, interest groups and local organizations will contact potential voters from that neighborhood." By reducing the likelihood that others in that neighborhood will register and vote, even if they personally have not been disenfranchised, criminal justice policies dampen the political clout of communities writ large.

These studies make important inroads into our understanding of the collective collateral consequences of criminal justice. Yet, even these somewhat dire analyses still critically underestimate the scope of relevant interventions in these communities, and misjudge the breadth of their potential effects. In fact, nearly all of the criminal justice literature that has focused anew on communities has taken incarceration as its central (and often sole) starting point, overlooking the more frequent and routine ways that punitive interactions take place in urban areas.

Like incarceration, the practice of police stops also unfolded in a spatial pattern; for example, the escalation in stops in New York City from under 100,000 in 2002 to close to 700,000 in 2011 was driven largely by "extreme increases in a subset of neighborhoods."[22] In fact, the levels of stops were so high in several key areas of the city that large swaths of the population there had been stopped and frisked at least once. For example, in Brownesville, approximately one-third of all residents were stopped and questioned in 2011.[23] The 28 blocks in the center of Brownesville had a citizen stop rate of 572 for every 1,000 citizens – in other words, more than half.[24] Another study of Brownesville found that in just eight blocks, which are home

to about 14,000 residents 52,000 stops were made from the beginning of 2006 to March 2010. Half of these stops were justified based on individuals' "furtive movements."[25] For each man between ages 15 and 34, the stop rate was so high that if distributed equally, each would have been stopped five times.[26]

By comparison, in the same city but a different neighborhood, such encounters were exceptional; in Borough Park, just two percent of residents were stopped and questioned by police. And even within the same neighborhoods, stop activity is spatially dependent. For example, compared to residents of immediately surrounding areas, those who lived in one of New York City's 300-plus public housing developments were twice as likely to be stopped by police.[27] And even these figures may understate one aspect of stop density – repeated interactions. According to surveys of residents in public housing units, a quarter had been stopped not once, but over twenty times in the course of a year.[28]

The census blocks and tracts where police stops have been most densely concentrated are disproportionately home to poor and black residents. Thus, by 2006, leading expert Jeffrey Fagan estimated that the likelihood of being stopped at least once by police in New York was 92 percent for a black male aged 18-19 (relative to 50 and 20 percent for Hispanic and white males in the same age cohort).[29] Put simply, a young black teenager in New York was virtually guaranteed one adversarial encounter with police.

The proportion of stops that coincided with arrest is also not evenly distributed across urban space; compared to a city average of 6 percent of stops that led to an arrest, less than one percent of Brownesville stops resulted in arrest.[30] Police stops in which force is deployed is also not well-predicted by the likelihood that the stop results in arrest, and is likewise importantly differentiated by space. For instance, in the 47th precinct (Morris Heights, University Heights,

and Fordham), a majority of stops involved the use of force, despite very few resulting in arrest. In contrast, in areas like Bayside, Queens, only five percent of stops involved the use of force, but many more of resulted in arrest.[31]

In addition, even when scholars have studied police-initiated contact with citizens, their focus has been limited to how these interactions shape individual evaluations of the police, tacitly assuming that the lessons imparted through police contact are confined to subsequent evaluations of that institution—whether perceptions of procedurally unfair treatment results in disdain for the law, or "legal cynicism," and the resulting criminogenic implications of this effect. Few have considered the potentially wider consequences of living in police "hot spots" for community-level civic outcomes. In particular, there has not yet been a rigorous analysis of whether communities whose central interface with the public sector is through police interventions are less amenable to government intervention more broadly. There is surprisingly little research examining whether the relative frequency of police stops in a community shapes citizens' orientations toward government, trust in public officials, or desire and ability to engage in civic and political life.

In concentrated areas of the urban core, encounters with police have become one of the primary points of contact between disadvantaged citizens and their government. For example, fully 20 percent of Chicago residents reported having had a police-initiated encounter in the past year and 64 percent of black Chicagoans reported an encounter.[32] Police are "streetcorner politician"[33] and the local embodiment of "street-level bureaucracy."[34] By maintaining order and providing a means of negotiating and regulating disputes, police can provide a necessary building block for community peace and well-being. When they are experienced as helpful and responsive, these characteristics may be generalized to the political system as a whole. When

instead residents see police as hostile or untrustworthy, though, these less benign traits may become the dominant view of the State.[35] In this paper, our aim is to explore whether concentrated and aggressive police surveillance damages the political voice of communities. Do places with high levels of police stops, where citizens experience these agents of local government as more adversarial, exhibit different patterns of civic engagement and government outreach?

Our Argument

Avoidance and Concentrated Policing

Why might communities undergoing higher police attention become more likely to evade involvement with government? Most basically, at high levels of policing, communities may come to see the police as an unwanted intrusion in their communities. They will therefore be less likely to call on police for assistance in times of need. Moreover, these views may spillover into ideas about government more broadly. When the state "is most likely to be encountered as a coercive agent of control," community residents become resistant to inviting government attention of any kind. These individuals may therefore avoid interactions with state authorities, seeing government as a "nemesis to be avoided rather than an ally to be cultivated."[36]

Previous studies, both quantitative and qualitative, have documented three related aspects of police behavior and mass attitudes that bear on this argument. First, *police contact at higher levels implies different styles of police behavior.* Studies have shown that police patrol differently in different neighborhood contexts[37] and view residents with greater suspicion because they reside in communities that are more crime-prone.[38] In disadvantaged, higher crime areas, police are more likely to use obtrusive patrolling styles, employ physical force, and engage in

misconduct.[39] Police may view and react to similar situations in quite different ways given the characteristics associated with communities. In disadvantaged areas, stops are not only more frequent, but more acrimonious, as attested to in several qualitative studies; suspects "report experiencing verbal abuse, excessive force, and unwarranted street stops."[40] Other studies have suggested that disadvantaged areas are both over- and under-policed; in other words, police tend to be visible and aggressive in their police-initiated contacts but slow to respond in citizen-initiated contact.[41] Thus, a higher level of police stops may not only mean more of the same, but serve as a marker of more antagonistic and fewer supportive contacts. Indeed, one study found that in such areas, police were more likely to use force in their contacts with residents even after other factors were controlled for, including the behavior and demeanor of the suspect.[42] Accordingly, community residents in highly-policed places were less likely to see police misconduct as an aberration, coming to anticipate police disrespect in their interactions.

In New York City specifically, where 'broken windows' policing has long been practiced, police have identified certain disadvantaged neighborhoods as "impact zones" where police resources are concentrated, "treating places rather than people as crime inspiring."[43] Here, an extraordinarily high proportion of police stops do not lead to arrests, summonses or the finding of contraband. Residents of these neighborhoods often see "warrior" style policing, where police employ aggressive tactics that may dissuade victims and law-abiding residents from seeking them out (e.g., the practice of turning victims into suspects by seeing if they have outstanding warrants). More troublingly, a greater share of police stops in these neighborhoods has been shown to be unwarranted, where the reason for the stop is of questionable constitutionality.[44]

Second, *policing can be a powerful influence on resulting attitudes about law enforcement*. Citizens derive evaluations of authorities from their personal and vicarious contact

with police, and what they learn is a function of the type of contact; their evaluations of that contact; and the neighborhood context of police encounters. For example, many studies find that direct, police-initiated contact with citizens leads to negative evaluations of the police among individuals, including less confidence in and satisfaction with police. These contacts thus help to explain citizen orientations and behavior; numerous studies find that evaluations of the police and compliance with the law are mediated by whether people perceive the police as having treated them fairly and respectfully, neutrally, and with consistency.[45]

Qualitative studies of policing likewise show that police encounters can be fraught with emotion. Even when encounters are brief and do not lead to a poor outcome for the suspect, they can and do have a psychological impact that continues to exert its effect long after the encounter; Fagan, Tyler, and Meares describe why: "being stopped by the government in a public space also suggests public discounting of worth. It appears to the person stopped to be a form of public shaming that derives from the feeling that the state has no problem displaying its power and control over the citizen on a public stage."[46]

Moreover, not all contacts carry the same weight. Some studies have shown that contact of any kind (whether positive or negative) leads to generally unfavorable attitudes, suggesting that it is not so much the quality but the fact of contact that matters; for instance, the British Crime Survey found that having no contact at all with police was the lone predictor of positive attitudes towards law enforcement.[47] However, Tom Tyler and others who focus on procedural justice disagree.[48] For instance, in a survey of residents in eight cities, Wesley Skogan observed an asymmetrical effect of police stops, such that bad encounters weighed much more heavily on evaluations of the police than good ones. Drawing on psychological findings that show unpleasant experiences influence behavior more than positive ones, he concludes: "the lessons of

bad things are learned more quickly, and forgotten more slowly, than the lessons of positive experiences."[49] In fact, Skogan finds that positive encounters with police are inconsequential for resulting attitudes, while negative contacts (both police and citizen-initiated) are far more impactful. The effect of having a bad experience "is four to fourteen times as great as that of having a positive experience" and evaluation of the experience accounted for 17 percent of overall variance in confidence in police.

Finally, *the effects of negative police contact may not be confined to those who experience it personally*. Rather, neighborhoods where police contact is concentrated may experience policing as a community event. Police encounters are not just direct but indirect – witnessed by family, neighbors, friends, onlookers. "These are severe moments of contact and are felt not only by the individual young person, but also by the onlookers in the community and family and friends who linger after the police have moved on."[50] In addition, as Skogan notes, "Police are a topic of everyday conversation with others, including neighbours and friends, and they may have their own experiences to relate."[51] Scholars have thus found an important spatial aspect to evaluations of the police; residents of neighborhoods with more disorder are much more likely to have negative evaluations of the police.[52] Indeed, vicarious experiences with police can influence attitudes more strongly than personal dealings with police.[53]

Connecting Police Encounters to Government Distrust and Avoidance

The concentration and quality of police contacts matter in large part because they shape citizens' behavior. Most directly, police-initiated contacts are strongly related to the probability that an individual will later call the police in times of need. In one large study, residents who experienced a traffic stop were much less likely to later contact the police for help, information,

or to report neighborhood problems.[54] Due to having repeated, and often hostile, confrontations with police, young men in some communities "placed a premium on avoiding officers whom they observed on the street… Youths rarely spoke to an officer unless he or she initiated an encounter or when it was absolutely necessary."[55] In one survey of youth in New York, some said they "feared seeking help from police because the situation too often escalated in undesirable ways", putting them at risk of arrest; only a quarter of youth in the survey (and even less among those who had experienced negative contacts) reported that they felt comfortable turning to police when they had a problem.[56]

Ethnographic, community-level studies have similarly found that residents in areas of high police-initiated contact practice 'systematic evasion' of the police and "engage in a variety of tactics to minimize the chances of contact with the police".[57] In these neighborhoods, residents may take a different route home from work simply to avoid a police interaction, and friends and relatives may be "reluctant to visit the neighborhood" for fear of police harassment.[58] Notably, residents of high-policing areas report feeling less safe *both* because they reside in high crime areas, and also because they see interactions with police as unsafe.[59] As one study describes, "the formal authorities are often a last resort for safety, despite their obvious presence in these neighborhoods."[60]

These reports are troubling. Yet, these patterns of policing not only shape residents' norms and behaviors vis-à-vis the police; rather, we argue here that concentrated police stops also shape how communities interface with the state more broadly. Citizens learn about political life through their contact with government agencies.[61] If citizens experience government as unresponsive, arbitrary, and authoritarian, as they often do in these encounters, these perceptions may spill over to other domains, informing broader perceptions of government generally. That is

to say, in areas where police represent the most familiar bureaucracy, perceptions of these particular authorities may come to inform views of government writ large. As Cathy Cohen writes, as a result of their experiences with criminal justice authorities, "young people have decided that their best survival strategy is to be invisible to state, community, and often family authorities….These young people have chosen a politics of invisibility, disengaging from all forms of politics and trying to remain invisible to officials who possibly could provide assistance but were more likely to impose greater surveillance and regulations on their lives."[62]

Our previous research supports this claim. In earlier work, we demonstrated that institutions of criminal justice have become an important site of political socialization, helping to define citizen participation, shape understandings of government, and alter the formation of social capital.[63] Specifically, we have shown that the civic lessons imprinted by criminal justice are antagonistic to democratic participation and positive forms of social capital. For instance, in a study of over 15,000 young adults, we found that being stopped and questioned by the police is associated with a four percent decrease in trust in the government, being incarcerated is associated with a decline of ten percent, and having been incarcerated for over a year was associated with a decline of fully 22 percent, net of other factors.[64] Importantly, our earlier work has also shown that encounters with criminal justice not only reduced trust and political efficacy, but incentivized avoidance of government entirely. As one man with whom we spoke put it, "I feel like if I contact a senator or governor, they'll probably want to put me in jail and leave me as a troublemaker. I'm serious. That's how I actually feel: 'I better stay below the radar…'" Another of our interviewees put it even more succinctly. When asked if he had considered seeking out assistance from public agencies or public officials, he replied: "I try to basically stay away from [government]."

These previous analyses made clear that criminal justice encounters shape political attitudes and behavior at the individual level. However, given their concentration within certain neighborhoods, punitive interventions may also have important feedbacks at a higher level of analysis, reducing the political voice of whole communities. Our primary aim in this paper is to broaden our lens in order to examine the full extent of avoidance responses to hyper-policing, and to assess its effects on citizen engagement at the neighborhood level.

Data and Methods

To examine the effects of policing on community political engagement, we combine spatial information on the frequency and character of police stops in New York City with geocoded data on nonemergency calls for city services. Based on a unique dataset of 1.2 million police stops and 3.1 million 311 calls in New York City from 2010 to 2011, we are able to analyze variation in government contact and patterns of policing. In all analyses, we aggregate both calls and stops to the census block group level (the smallest unit of analysis with comparable socioeconomic data available). Block groups are small areas, usually a few neighborhood blocks, averaging about 1,000 residents. Because our data include the date of each police stop and the exact date of each service request, we can explore both spatial and temporal patterns. The analyses we present below are based on 148,728 observations, 6,197 block groups for each of 24 months.

Measuring Community Contact: The Frequency and Character of Policing

In recent years, several high profile court cases have focused national attention on policing in New York. New York City has experienced a remarkable rise in the number of Terry

stops over the past decade. Notably, higher rates of stop activity in New York did not appear to increase the "hit rate"; the proportion of stops that resulted in either an arrest or evidence of illegal activity stayed remarkably stable (See Figure 1). Instead, more stops engaged a "surplus" population – normal, everyday folk going about their business but who "fit a description" of a suspect or who were proceeding through high crime areas where they lived or worked.

In pressing their claims, plaintiffs have argued that the stop-and-frisk practices of the NYPD have resulted in tens of thousands of unwarranted stops, constituting a widespread violation of constitutional rights. According to NYPD data obtained by the NYCLU, almost nine out of 10 individuals stopped and frisked in the Big Apple were "completely innocent."[65] In addition, critics claim that the NYPD practices racially discriminatory policing. The point to recent figures that suggest that almost 90 percent of individuals stopped in 2011 were either black or Latino; "There were more stops of black men aged 14 to 24 than there are members of that demographic in the city."[66]

Figure 1. NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Activity by Race of Citizen and Outcome, 2003-2011



Source: http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data

Our data on police stops come from the public files of the NYPD, who are required to collect and report most police stops of pedestrians along with the location and reason for the stop, demographic information about the person stopped, characteristics of the stop (e.g. whether the individual was frisked, whether force was used) and the outcome of the interaction (e.g., arrest or contraband). We successfully matched 92% of individual police stops to their census block group location based on their XY coordinates. Our analysis relies only on those census block groups that have a residential population over 100, which excludes block groups located in central business districts, parks, cemeteries, and industrial areas.[67] Police made at least 1.2 million stops during the 2010-11 period; however, even this high number is likely an undercount given that police are only mandated to document stops in the event that a stop involves frisk, force, search, or the "person refuses to identify him or herself;" outside this mandate, police can voluntarily complete the UF-250 form.[68] We cannot know how many stops were not recorded because they

did not meet the conditions for a required documentation; however, prior analyses have found this underreporting not to bias results.[69]

In our analyses, we focus not just on the concentration of stops, but on the concentration of "bad" or surplus stops – those stops that do not result in a finding of wrongdoing, contraband, or weapons. As Tom Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan note, "it is not the fact of being stopped… Rather, people focus upon police disrespect or rudeness, or unneeded harassment…".[70] Because our data on police encounters are based on police reports, we do not have a measure of how each stop was subjectively perceived by the subject. However, we do have a number of important objective measures of how the subject was treated, including whether he was frisked or searched, whether force was employed (and, if so, what type), and whether the stop produced enough evidence to warrant a summons or arrest. Many police encounters are not only verbal exchanges; in almost a quarter, city residents are physically handled.

The overwhelming majority of cases where police use frisks do not result in a finding of contraband or evidence to justify an arrest (90 percent). Similarly, 86 percent of the time that police physically handled a stopped person with some amount of force, no arrest was made. Beyond undergoing a lot of stops, then, communities where stops are generally of low quality will, we argue, incentivize avoidance behavior and diminish the willingness of residents to seek assistance from government.[71] As a proxy for low quality stops, we calculate the share of frisks and the share of stops involving force that did not result in summons or arrest.[72] When frisks are high but do not lead to arrest, they signal to the person and community that they are suspects without just cause; "the fact that so few stops are accurate ensures the spread of the denial of the dignity of innocence." Using force in police encounters is particularly likely to influence how a

stop is interpreted by the subject and in the community narratives that form in neighborhoods, particularly if force is used when evidence of wrongdoing is in abeyance.[73]

Measuring Community Engagement: 311 Calls for Service

We use 311 calling because these requests provide a concrete and important measure of whether and how people pro-actively engage with their local government. Any citizen can call 311 in order to seek out government service directly, rather than waiting for their letter to be answered by a public official. This type of engagement is therefore very low cost, as well as being easy, fast, and anonymous for citizens across the socio-economic spectrum. In New York, a citizen can pick up the phone to call 311 and their call is answered by a live person in less than a minute or they can submit their request online, an iPhone app, or Twitter and they are even able to upload a picture of the issue. Not surprisingly, citizens therefore use the system frequently to register their demands, make claims, and communicate their needs to government. In New York City, surveys have shown that citizens are widely aware of the system (largely through effective publicity campaigns and a logo plastered throughout the city) and are generally satisfied with it.[75] Its popularity can also be gauged by the frequency with which citizens employ it; in a given month, citizens make 50,000 calls on average, adding up to 18.7 million calls a year, or about 224 per 100 residents. Thus, it is fair to say that citizens engage with their local government this way over and above other, more traditional means of participation. Even if not every single person uses the system, we can safely assume that it goes well over the single-digit percentages of people that ever say they write or call a public official in social surveys.

Second, citizens may use 311 not just to register their problems with local authorities, but also to become involved in the life of their community. As one writer notes: “Also crucial to the

311 ethos is the idea of civic accountability: By giving New Yorkers an easy way to report broken streetlights or graffiti or after-hours construction, the service helps them play a role in solving the problems they see in their own neighborhoods."[76] The head executive of one centralized constituent-focused government system, SeeClickFix, argues that "potholes are the gateway drug for civic engagement."[77] By voicing their complaints, however mundane, citizens interact with government at the local level and obtain a response.

Third, studies have suggested that 311 is not only a way for citizens to keep government accountable, but has become a key tool for understanding the concerns and desires of citizens and communities; in fact, local politicians report using the data to explore what goes on in their district and assess constituents'' needs and problems. One local politician noted that it was nice to have 311 data "at [his] fingertips, as an elected official, when I'm trying to decide where I'm going to spend dollars within my district… it's nice to have that sort of data feed to help guide me in my decisions."[78] Politicians and bureaucrats report using 311 requests in deciding how to allocate resources, keeping track of what the public finds important, and deciding whether to initiate policy responses. Through 311 data, local officials learn about problems specific to certain communities and, through 311, they can directly communicate with citizens, to let them know that the government agency implicated in the request has completed repairs or will otherwise address the reported issue. As one study noted, 311 "helps city leaders detect patterns that might otherwise have escaped notice. After the first survey of 311 complaints ranked excessive noise as the number one source of irritation among residents, the Bloomberg administration instituted a series of noise-abatement programs, going after the offenders whom callers complained about most often…"[79]

Prior to the implementation of 311, citizens in New York City had to call use a Blue Book of 40 pages of city agencies and figure out for themselves which number to call.[80] New York City launched its 311 calls service in 2003, as a "cornerstone of Mayor Michael Bloomberg's effort to make government more accessible and customer-service oriented."[81] In its first two years, 20 million calls were registered and responded to, and system has processed a hundred million calls since its inception. The program currently operates with a budget of $46 million and almost 600 employees.[82]

While 311 calls centers have been launched in many other cities, the call center in New York stands out for its frequent use by citizens and also for its breadth; it is one of the few such programs to operate a 24-hour service, fields requests for service and information "in over 170 different languages", and offers information on over 3,600 separate topics. Relative to 311 call centers nationwide, New York's is the largest in absolute terms and second in the calls per capita that it received (next to San Francisco).[83] The types of calls NY 311 processes vary widely, from individual queries about how to obtain a birth certificate or absentee ballot, to complaints about missed trash collection or heating outages in winter, to queries about where to vote and who holds a particular public office. Table 1 displays the distribution of types of calls to 311 in New York City. As the table shows, a large majority of calls address issues related to housing and transportation, and a substantial proportion (about 10 percent) concern issues related to crime and safety. Once a call to 311 is placed by a city resident, complaints and requests for service are entered into a database and assigned a tracking number.[84]

Table 1. Types of Calls to New York City 311, 2010-2011

Agency	Percent
311	.3

Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA)	1
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)	8.6
Department for the Aging (DFTA)	<.1
Department of Buildings (DOB)	6
Department of Education (DOE)	.2
Refunds and Adjustments (DOF)	<.1
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH)	2.9
Department of Information Technology and Telecommunications (DOITT)	.1
Department of Transportation (DOT)	14.1
Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR)	4.7
DSNY (Department of Sanitation)	8.0
Economic Development Corporation (EDC)	.1
Fire Department (FDNY)	.1
Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD)	42.4
Police Department (NYPD)	10.1
Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC)	1.4

Data on calls to 311 are taken from the NYC Open Data site, which provides information on the location of each request for service, as well as categorizing the nature of the complaint and the responsible city agency. Using the latitude and longitude of the complaint, we assigned each call to its census block group and used the date information to aggregate calls to the 24 months across the study period. We use these calls as a measure of how readily citizens seek government help when they need a local issue resolved or when they seek assistance. While not traditionally among the ways we measure citizens' political behavior, we argue that these requests for service are indeed an important mechanism through which citizens connect with local government and engage in their community. They are, as one report puts it, the 'front door' for citizen access to government.[85] Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there has been only one previous analysis of 311 calls and none by scholars interested in the dynamics of community engagement with government.[86]

Analysis

Before formally testing our theory, we explore some descriptive patterns in the police stops data. During the two-year period we examine, police stopped residents of New York City neighborhoods at a mean rate of 170 per thousand residents. However, the average obscures substantial variation across the city. Figure 2 shows the spatial pattern of stops across neighborhoods. (We display these patterns here by census tract, for the purposes of clarity.) As the figure makes evident, police stops exhibit a dense clustering in certain areas of the city. While a quarter of New York City block groups had a stop rate under 35 per 1000 residents, at the opposite end, fully 25 percent of block groups had a stop rate over 185 per 1000. At the most extreme, 111 areas had a stop rate over one per resident.

This spatial clustering is statistically significant based on the Moran's Index of .15 (z-score=65.02), indicating that there is less than a one percent chance that the pattern could have been the result of random chance. The results indicate a high degree of spatial autocorrelation; thus, in our multivariate analyses, we use fixed effects models and spatially weighted regression to account for spatial interdependence.

Figure 2. Geographic Pattern of Terry Stops in New York City, 2010-2011



Descriptively, police stops have their greatest incidence in high poverty, high minority block groups. For instance, the mean stop rate in block groups where over half of residents are black or Latino is 253 per 1000. By comparison, the mean rate in majority white areas is strikingly lower at 92 per 1000 residents. Likewise, police stops are especially pronounced in areas characterized by high poverty.

In Figure 3, we show the results of a spatial analysis that tests whether spatial clustering of high or low stops or outliers are more pronounced than we would otherwise observe in a random distribution. As the figure shows, there are several "hot spots" throughout the city – clustered areas of high police stops. In Manhattan, block groups in the general neighborhoods of East Harlem and East New York have particularly high stop activity per capita; in Brooklyn, the areas stretching from Brooklyn Heights and Boerum Hill to Bedford-Stuyvesant to Ocean Hill-

Brownesville have a dense cluster of block groups with stop rates in the 500 per 1000 range (and sometimes higher); in the Bronx, Morrisanna, Mott Haven and Melrose, and a few others are hot spots; in Queens, the areas in and around Jamaica have significantly higher stop rates. A few areas (those in yellow) denote block groups that have high stop activity but are surrounded by areas where stop activity is much lower.

Figure 3. Police Stop Clusters and Outliers by Census Block Group



Fewer areas are "cold spots," clusters of significantly lower police stop activity. The large cold spot in Brooklyn comprises the primarily Italian and Jewish middle-class areas of Brooklyn (Boro Park, Bensonhurst, Bay Ridge, Dyker Heights, Fort Hamilton, Sunset Park, and

Windsor Terrace); a cold spot also can be spotted in the Upper East Side of Manhattan. The areas in gray may have high or low activity but are not significantly distinct from neighboring census block groups.

There is significant variation across the city not just in the concentration of stops but also in the incidence of searches and frisks, use of force, and arrest *conditional on being stopped*. Of all stops, 56 percent led to a frisk, nine percent led to a search, and in 22 percent of these stops (287,727) police used force on the subject. Across block groups, the average frequency of stops involving frisks and use of force per thousand residents was 94 and 37, respectively. As a point of reference, only six percent of all stops led to an arrest. Weapons were found in just one percent of all stops, and just two percent of stops where subjects were frisked.

A distinction can be made between simple concentrations of police stops and concentrations of police stops where force is deployed – particularly when the suspect is never arrested or found with contraband. Higher stop activity implies different styles of policing; places with higher than average stop rates have a higher average share of frisks and force that do not result in arrest . Specifically, in areas where police stops are particularly frequent, the share of stops that do not result in an arrest are especially high, even when these stops employ frisks or force. For instance, police exhibited physical force in almost a quarter of stops; yet, like frisks that never led to arrest or illegal finding, the places with the highest stops tend to also have a greater share of force used on suspects without enough evidence for an arrest.

The share of these low quality stops varies significantly by neighborhood; the map in Figure 4 displays a significant patterning in the use of frisks across the urban landscape, and this is mirrored in patterns of use of force. When the police stop a person in large areas of Manhattan and Staten Island, they find evidence to make an arrest over half of the time; in comparison, for

the dark cluster within the Bronx, and the neighborhoods of Astoria, Elmhurst, and Jackson Heights in Brooklyn, the vast majority of frisks do not result in arrest. A cluster analysis of police use of force shows that "inefficient" use of force (those that do not lead to arrest) is clustered somewhat differently than police stops. The highest share of force that does not lead to arrest occurred in the West Bronx, including the areas of Bedford Park, Fordham, Kingsbridge, University Heights, and Morris Heights. In Queens, like "bad" frisk patterns, the use of force without arrest was most concentrated in Corona, Elmhurst, Jackson Heights, Flushing, Queensboro Hill, Whitestone, and Murray Hill. In Brooklyn, the concentrations are significantly higher in Brownesville, East New York, Canarsie, Crown Heights, and Bed-Sty.

Figure 4. Share of Frisks that Do Not Lead to Arrest



Police Activity and Calls for Service

Like policing patterns, calls to New York City's 311 line are concentrated across geography. Figure 5 displays the distribution of non-emergency requests for service by census block group. There are roughly 3.1 million total calls to 311 during the 2010-2012 period and the calls per 1000 population varies substantially by area. The global Moran's test indicates that service requests are not dispersed but exhibit a clustered pattern (z-score=46.45; p=.000). Block groups in which a majority of residents are black or Latino have much higher service request rates (496 calls per 1000 residents) compared to non-black and Latino areas (362 calls per 1000). Poorer areas also tend to have greater call rates. This is largely unsurprising given that such areas likely have a greater concentration of things to call about – missed trash collection, heating problems in winter, physical decay on their streets, and the like.

Figure 5. Calls for 311 Service, 2010-2011



That both 311 calls and police activity are geographically clustered in low-income and minority neighborhoods conforms to our expectations. However, a neighborhood's capacity and willingness to reach out to local government may hinge on a variety of factors that are not related to how densely concentrated police interrogations are in the area. These communities may be less likely to submit non-emergency claims for the same reasons that some individuals are less likely to participate in government in other ways - because they have less income or education. Heavily minority communities may have also more non-citizen or new immigrant residents that are not English proficient or who are newcomers to American politics. It may be that communities with more homeowners are more likely to call because they are more vested in keeping up their streets and homes.

In order to account for these differences, we first employ a multivariate regression model where we control for racial and ethnic demographics, population density, age distributions, share of households that own their home, and measures of median household income and education level all derived from the American Community Survey 2006-2010 5-year averages. In addition, highly disadvantaged, socially isolated communities are likely to register a greater incidence of criminal offenses, which could drive both a higher rate of police stops per capita and a reduced likelihood of calling 311. We therefore include in our models several measures of disadvantage and spatial inequality from the ACS 2006-2010 5-year: share of families in poverty, high school dropout rates, proportion of single-headed households, unemployment, share of families receiving public assistance, and the percent of vacant units. For the same reasons, we control for crime by using precinct-level data on serious crime rates (murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, grand larceny).[87] (Crime data at lower levels of aggregation are not available.) If, as we

expect, the spatial concentration of police stops is related to reaching out to government net of the social disadvantage observed within neighborhoods, multivariate models can help us to be more confident that we are not simply picking up the dynamic relationship between disorganization, collective efficacy, and crime.

The results of these models are somewhat surprising. Counter to our expectations, we find a *positive* and significant relationship between the number of per capita police stops and the frequency of calls to 311 across block groups. Across block groups and controlling for other factors, use of 311 appears to increase somewhat as the frequency of police activity increases. The magnitude of the effect is small, but statistically significant, and remains so in various specifications of the regression model. In these models, we also do not find any strong effects on other measures of policing, including the proportion of stops that involve frisks or the use of force.

We then analyze whether the relationship between stops and calls differs across different neighborhood types. In particular, we suspect that low-income and high-minority neighborhoods may be more susceptible to a diminishing effect of police surveillance, given the degree to which police patterns in these areas are substantively distinct. In order to assess this idea, we introduce an interaction effect into our models. First, we estimate the same models with the addition of a measure that interacts per capita stops with the proportion of non-white residents in the block group. The interaction term is negative and highly significant. This suggests that the positive effect of stops on 311 calls is significantly attenuated in minority neighborhoods. In fact, when we divide block groups by whether they have above or below the mean proportion of white residents, we see a clear difference in the strength of the relationship between stops and calls; in

high-minority block groups relative to more homogenously white block groups, the magnitude of the effect of per capita stops on per capita calls is halved.

We replicate this analysis to look at heterogeneity across neighborhoods by income. When we include an interaction between median household income and per capita stops in the multivariate model, it is again highly significant and negative. The interpretation is the same and the magnitude of the difference is similar. In both high and lower-income block groups, there is a positive relationship between per capita stops and per capita calls. However, the relationship is sizably smaller in lower-income block groups relative to wealthier neighborhoods.

Policing and 311 Relationship Over Time

In the analyses we have just described, we examine variation in the frequency and character of NYC policing patterns across geography and its effects on the frequency of calls to 311 per capita. However, there are reasons to be cautious about how to interpret these analyses. Most obviously, police behavior is likely to be endogenous to features of the block group, such as crime rates and levels of disorder, which are likely also to be predictive of 311 calls. While we control for a host of potential confounders in these models, we may still have biased estimates of these relationships.

In order to begin to address this concern, we leverage the fact that our data capture spatial variation in policing across block groups, but also variation over time within block groups. We are therefore able to look at block group/month data and examine whether variation in policing patters across time affects the frequency of calls to 311. To do this, we estimate the log of total per capita 311 calls as a function of several factors: per capita police stops, percent of stops that result in arrest, percent of stops where an individual is frisked, and percent of stops where force

is employed. Finally, we include fixed effects for year and for block group. These measures help to account for unmeasured factors unique to the year, as well as controlling for block-group level factors that might affect the likelihood of 311 call use, including demographic characteristics of residents and relative need for assistance. We also employ this same model with a second dependent variable: the log of per capita 311 calls related specifically to NYPD issues.

In Table 2, we present sets of models where total calls to 311 and calls to 311 concerning crime and safety and regressed on measures of policing quality, as well as year and block group fixed effects. In all specifications of these models, we use a logged version of the dependent variable. Like the multivariate regression models we describe above, the results of these models show a positive relationship between per capita stops and use of 311. However, we do find a negative relationship between per capita stop rates and the use of 311 calls when they are specifically related to issues of crime and safety. A one unit increase in the per capita stop rate is associated with a roughly six percent decline in per capita calls to 311 that are referred to the NYPD.

In addition, these models support our contention that characteristics of police stop-and-frisk patterns are negatively predictive of local community participation. Specifically, we find that a one unit increase in the proportion of all stops that involve the use of force is associated with a .05 percent decrease in total 311 calls per capita. Similarly, an increase in the proportion of stops that use force but do not result in arrest is associated with lower rates of 311 calls concerning crime and safety (by about .03 percent), as well as lower per capita rates of 311 calls overall (by about .05 percent).

Table 2. Multivariate Models with Year and Block Group Fixed Effects

	Per capita calls re: NYPD (logged)	**Total per capita calls (logged)**
Model 1. "Good" Stops		
Per capita stops	-0.0616**	0.0718**
Proportion stops that involve frisks	0.0000	0.0001
Proportion stops that involve search	-0.0001	0.0001
Proportion stops that involve force	-0.0002	-0.0005**
Proportion stops that lead to arrest	0.0000	-0.0004
Proportion stops that lead to summons	0.0014	0.0009
constant	-130.7629***	119.2047***
Model 2. "Bad" Stops		
Per capita stops	-0.0616**	0.0718**
Proportion frisks that do not lead to arrest	0.0000	0.0001
Proportion search that does not lead to arrest	-0.0001	0.0001
Proportion force that does not lead to arrest	-0.0003*	-0.0005**
Proportion stops that lead to arrest	-0.0001	-0.0005*
Proportion stops that lead to summons	0.0014	0.0009
constant	-130.5988***	118.8825***

$p < .10$ #, $p < .05$*, $p < .01$ **, $p < .001$***

Additional Analyses

The most significant hurdle in this analysis is that variation in stops across neighborhoods covaries to a large extent with other features of the spatial context. To better assess a potential causal relationship between policing and 311, we therefore exploit an additional source of exogenous variation: the organization of the NYPD into different precincts across the city. While stops are highly concentrated in disadvantaged areas, these areas may fall into very different police precincts, where policing styles and approach, training, force strength, leadership, and

community relationships differ. In addition, studies have shown that extremely high stop rates can be attributed to just a handful of officers; one study found that a mere seven percent of police officers were responsible for over half (54 percent) of stops of city residents.[88]

To illustrate, we examine the difference between census block groups that are directly adjacent to each other and thus have similar demographic and crime profiles but are located in distinct police precincts. One such area is the set of block groups that are on the border of Precincts 83 and 81 in Brooklyn (the Bushwick and Bed-Sty areas). For the block groups along the border but within the 83rd precinct, stop rates are in the 100-300 per 1000 range. But directly across the border from them, in the same neighborhood but falling across precinct lines, are block groups that have stop rates that are much higher – over 500 per 1000.

We can use precinct designations to gain some additional leverage over whether differences in police stop activity in similar neighborhoods, but divided by an arbitrary precinct boundary, have different service request volumes. To do this, we first use all of our stop-and-frisk data, aggregated to the precinct level, to estimate a predicted stop rate for each individual precinct given the gender, age, education and income distributions of its residents and its reported crime rate. We then create a measure of how far each precinct's actual stop rate falls above or below its predicted value. Precincts whose real stop rates fall above the predicted value are considered "high stop", and those whose stop rates fall below the predicted value are considered "low stop" precincts. We construct a second measure of "high" and "low use of force" precincts using the same procedure, but substituting the predicted and actual rate at which force is employed during police stops in each precinct.

We then use a multivariate matching algorithm (GenMatch) to match census block groups that fall in high stop precincts to those that fall in low stop precincts on all available

covariates, including the full set of controls employed in the multivariate models we have already described. In these analyses, we exclude all block groups that fall within 100 feet to either side of a precinct boundary (see Figure 6). As our theory relies on the idea that citizens are affected not only by their personal contact with police but by the community-level experience of seeing and sharing vicarious experiences, we seek to avoid matching neighboring precincts where two precincts' differing police patterns are equally likely to be witnessed by block group residents.

Figure 6. Block Groups on Precinct Boundaries



[RESULTS FOR STOPS; RESULTS FOR FORCE]

Discussion

We were surprised to find that at the block group level, police stops have a strong and positive relationship with 311 service requests; as citizens encounter more police, they call 311 more, not less. We might still emphasize caution in interpreting our results, however. Despite our efforts to address issues of endogeneity, we cannot rule out the possibility that this relationship is still explained by these neighborhoods' larger spatial context. That is, it is still quite possible that the positive relationship we see results from the fact that both stops and calls are proxies for disadvantage; the same communities where police stops cluster are places characterized by high concentrations of poverty and blight and physical decay; they are places, therefore, where need for service is likely higher in absolute terms. They may have more broken streetlights, vacant buildings, and noise to report than other blocks of the city. In addition, these may be places where community institutions are rarer.[89] Thus, citizens may come to rely on 311 in absence of other channels. We took steps to address the serious collinearity between stops and disadvantage through introducing controls, fixed effects, and matching block group pairs across different precincts. Even still, we clearly cannot ascertain the counterfactual – how much areas of high police activity *would have called* 311 if stops had not been as high.

In light of our findings, we propose three avenues for future research. First, we might incorporate some measure of demand for local government service, which could serve as a baseline against which to measure 311 calls activity. Along the lines of Robert Sampson's measures of objective disorder, having some gauge of how much communities should be initiating service requests would aid us in seeing how much they diverge from expectation. Second, police stops in New York City decreased by half from 2011 to the first quarter of 2012 due to a class-action lawsuit. When the 2012 data on stops are released, we hope to examine the

effect of this "shock" on calls for service. Finally, in the future we might further disaggregate the 311 call data, to explore not just the frequency, but types of 311 calling across communities.

Additionally, we are eager to see whether the patterns we found here are evident in other cities that have turned to order maintenance policing tactics in recent years. New York may currently be the most high-profile stop-and-frisk program that has come under judicial scrutiny, but other cities have also come under recent scrutiny for aggressive police stops that rarely lead to arrest; a grand jury in Baltimore recently found officers in that city were making many stops without justification, and a class-action lawsuit was successfully pursued against police in Philadelphia for its aggressive stop-and-frisk practice.

Conclusion

Despite our mixed results, this paper makes several important contributions to the on-going conversation about the role of criminal justice institutions in shaping American political life. Most basically, we hope that this exploration is the first of many that go beyond the typically limited set of ways scholars have imagined and measured both criminal justice interventions and their effect. The participation literature has largely depicted American political life as "electoral spectacle" and as such, measured engagement with government as the individual behaviors centered on electing representatives to office and registering one's political preferences.[90] But aren't citizens connected to government on the many non-election days of the year and don't they make their needs and wants known in many other ways than simple selection of lawmakers?

We believe studies of American politics and criminal justice would benefit greatly from broadening their focus to measure these dynamics in new and more encompassing ways. For

audiences concerned with democratic life in American communities, we hope to expand how participation and engagement is conceived. Participation in political life need not just be confined to how citizens behave in the voting booth or local civic group, but can and should include the daily, mundane, and more direct way that citizens connect with their governing institutions.

We use 311 service requests because these requests provide a concrete and important measure of whether and how people pro-actively engage with their local government on a routine basis. Students of American politics and mass publics may learn a great deal about political life through this rich data source and through indicators like it that allow us to go beyond what preferences the public holds at election time, to tap into how residents seek government aid for pressing problems in their neighborhoods and communities.

Expanding the scope of analysis is even more important for those who are particularly concerned with the impact of criminal justice interventions on the attitudes and behavior of individuals and communities. Our paper is part of a larger effort to begin to understand what concentrated policing and incarceration means for the democratic life, political agency, and social capital bonds of communities. As scholars, we have not even scratched the surface of how criminal justice interventions may have shaped the political spaces people inhabit, particularly the urban poor. This paper focuses only on one city, on one measure of engagement and one type of surveillance intervention. Yet, we hope it will be part of a broader research agenda that can begin to unearth whether and how policing and punishment influence American democracy on the ground. As part of this effort, we urge scholars to think not only about incarceration, but about the many ways that citizens encounter the punitive "hand" of state power.

Previous scholarship has suggested that police legitimacy in high-surveillance communities is in much lower reserve, and mistrust in the police is more pervasive, which often has consequences for cooperation with police in non-adversarial dealings. Aggressive police patrolling has long raised alarms among legal theorists and sociologists concerned with "legal cynicism," the belief that legal institutions are arbitrary, unjust, and unfair and the resulting behaviors of noncooperation. They found that communities that registered high levels of legal cynicism were more likely to tolerate deviance and less likely to cooperate with law enforcement, an implication of which was higher criminal offending. Anti-snitching norms (giving information to police that might implicate community members) may be widespread; residents may be more reluctant to call the police even when they have been victimized or witnessed illegal activity or when it is in their interest to do so, a code of silence that is adopted in response to high levels of mistrust of the police.[92] Residents in these communities are more likely to hold negative views of the police,[93] which have been shown to diminish compliance with the law, cooperation with the police, and the probability of serving as a witness, reporting a crime, or identifying criminals.[94]

But if people in neighborhoods acquire a legal socialization from inhabiting areas where people encounter unwanted police attention, it stands to reason that police activity may also shape their orientations to local government and willingness to seek it out when in need. Our purpose in this paper was to go beyond measuring legal cynicism to examine whether concentrated and low quality police stops shape not just the legal, but the political sphere within communities. We find that the quality of policing in communities, particularly the extent to which aggressive stop-and-frisk programs employ the use of force, has a significant relationship to the frequency with which citizens seek out city government to resolve their issues and concerns.

In our previous work, we suggested that criminal justice contact can have potentially detrimental effects for citizen incorporation into the body politic. For individuals, direct experience with the "strong arm of the state" reduces feelings of political efficacy, shapes political cognitions, and undermines pro-social networks and identities. The results presented here present a somewhat more optimistic picture. The data suggest that rates of policing are not in and of themselves detrimental to engagement at the community level. Indeed, the prevalence of police activity may be associated with higher rates of local engagement, or at least need not profoundly diminish it. We note, however, that the *quality* of policing is also significant. In this, we echo our earlier work and that of others who have suggested that the character of criminal justice interventions is likely to be salient to how they are understood by citizens, and the role that they play in communities. Good policing can be critical to reducing crime, enabling neighborhoods to construct strong and stable civic organizations. However, overly-aggressive police tactics that criminalize routine behaviors and forcibly detain residents as they move throughout the public space are likely to deter citizen engagement with police, as well as with other institutions of local government that might otherwise be a valuable resource for resolving issues and concerns at the community level.

[1] The quote is from Donna Lieberman, executive director of the NYCLU: "Policing in New York is a tale of two cities." Simone Weichselbaum, "Brownsville has most police 'stop-and-questions' in city," *New York Daily News*, May 16, 2012.
[2]Bailey et al v City of Philadelphia et al (3rd Cir. 2010) US District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/Baileycomp.pdf
[3] Robert Samuels, "A hoodie owner's decision calculus," Washington Post, April 6, 2012, p. B02.
[4] Chris Francescani, Janet Roberts, and Melanie Hicken, "Insight: Under siege: "Stop and frisk" polarizes New York," *Reuters*, July 3, 2012.
[5] Sukumar Ganapati, *Using Geographic Information Systems to Increase Citizen Engagement*, The IBM Center for The Business of Government, 2010.
[6] Cory Fleming, *Call 311: Connecting Citizens to Local Government Final Report*, (International City/County Management Association 2008), 39.
[7] Fleming, *Call 311.*
[8] Pew Charitable Trusts, Philadelphia Research Initiative, "A Work In Progress: Philadelphia's 311 System After One Year." March 2, 2010, p. 4.
[9]Fleming, *Call 311.*
[10] Weaver and Lerman 2010; Lerman and Weaver forthcoming
[11] Dorothy E. Roberts, "The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities," *Stanford Law Review* 56.5 (2004): 1271-1305, 1281.
[12] Statistics on the concentration of prisoners are from various Urban Institute reports available here: http://www.urban.org/projects/reentry-portfolio/publications.cfm
[13] Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, and Jan Holland, "Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods," *Fordham Urban Law Review* 30 (2003): 1551-1602.
[14] Robert J. Sampson and Charles Loeffler, "Punishment's Place: the Local Concentration of Mass Incarceration," Daedalus 139 (2010): 20-31, 23.
[15] Todd R. Clear, "The effects of high imprisonment rates on communities." *Crime and Justice* 37.1 (2008): 97-132, 107.
[16] Definition of efficacy is from Roberts, "Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration." Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. "Neighborhoods and violent crime: A multilevel study of collective efficacy." *Science* 277.5328 (1997): 918-924.
[17] Todd R. Clear, "The effects of high imprisonment rates on communities." *Crime and Justice* 37.1 (2008): 97-132, 117.
[18] Todd Clear, *Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods Worse,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
[19] Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West, and Jan Holland, "Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City Neighborhoods," *Fordham Urban Law Review* 30 (2003): 1551-1602.
[20] Lerman, Amy E. The Modern Prison Paradox. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
[21] Traci Burch, "Trading Democracy for Justice?: The Spillover Effects of Imprisonment on Voter Registration in Atlanta," (unpublished paper, American Politics Workshop, University of Chicago, Chicago, 2008).
[22]In majority black neighborhoods (over 60 percent black), Fagan and Davies find that not only are stops more common and less likely to lead to arrest, but stops of minorities are even less likely to lead to a finding of criminal wrongdoing. Thus, not only are residents of these areas more likely to undergo a stop, but "the standards used to justify stops in their neighborhoods may be lower than those in neighborhoods with higher White populations." Fagan and Davies, "Street Stops and Broken Windows," 311.
[23] Weichselbaum, "Brownsville has most police 'stop-and-questions' in city."
[24] Chris Francescani, Janet Roberts, and Melanie Hicken, "Insight: Under siege: "Stop and frisk" polarizes New York," *Reuters*, July 3, 2012.
[25] Ray Rivera, Al Baker, and Janet Roberts, "A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops," New York Times, July 12, 2010.
[26] Rivera, Baker, and Roberts, "A Few Blocks."
[27] Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies, and Adam Carlis, "Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing," Columbia Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper Number 12-314, 2012.

[28] Adam Carlis, "The Illegality of Vertical Patrols," *Columbia Law Review* 109(2009).
[29] Jeffrey A. Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies, and Valerie West, "Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City," in Stephen K. Rice and Michael D. White (eds.), *Race, Ethnicity, and Policing: New and Essential Readings,* New York: New York University Press, 2010, 309-348.
[30] Rivera, Baker, and Roberts, "A Few Blocks."
[31] Rivera, Ray, "Pockets of City See Higher Use of Force During Police Stops," *New York Times*, August 15, 2012.

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[38] Ronald Weitzer and Steven A. Tuch, *Race and Policing in America: Conflict and Reform*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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[40] Ronald Weitzer and Rod K. Brunson, "Strategic Responses to the Police Among Inner-City Youth," *Sociological Quarterly* 50 (2009): 235-256.
[41] Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law, (New York: Vintage Books, 1997).
[42] Terrill and Reisig, "Neighborhood Context and Police Use of Force."
[43] Jack R. Greene, "Police Field Stops: What Do We Know, and What Does It Mean?" in *Key Issues in the Police Use of Pedestrian Stops and Searches: Discussion Papers from an Urban Institute Roundtable*, Nancy La Vigne, Pamela Lachman, Andrea Matthews, S. Rebecca Neusteter, 35. August 2012. Urban Institute Justice Policy Center Research Papers.
[44] Fagan and Davies, "Street Stops and Broken Windows."
[45] Tom Tyler, *Why People Obey the Law: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Compliance*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); Tyler, Tom R., and Yuen J. Huo. *Trust in the law: Encouraging public cooperation with the police and courts*. Vol. 5. Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2002; Sunshine, Jason, and Tom R. Tyler. "The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing." *Law & Society Review* 37.3 (2003): 513-548; McCluskey, John David. *Police requests for compliance: Coercive and procedurally just tactics*. LFB Scholarly Pub., 2003.
[46] Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler, and Tracey Meares, "Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York," Unpublished Paper, 9.
[47] Wesley Skogan, "Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police," *Policing & Society* 16.2 (2006): 99-126.
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[49] Skogan, "Asymmetry in the Impact of Encounters with Police," 106.
[50] Brett G. Stoudt, Michelle Fine, and Madeline Fox, "Growing Up Policed in the Age of Aggressive Policing Policies," *New York Law School Law Review* 56(2011): 1331-1370, 1341.
[51] Wesley Skogan, "Assessing Asymmetry: The Life Course of a Research Project," *Policing and Society* 22.3 (2012): 270-279, 276. Important to note that some studies find that it is not contact per se but prior expectations and attitudes about the police that shape how contact influences evaluations.
[52] These studies suggest that people who inhabit disadvantaged neighborhoods report less positive evaluations and confidence in the police because to a certain extent, they hold police responsible for higher crime and disorder in their midst. Robert Sampson and Dawn Bartusch, "Legal Cynicism and Subcultural Tolerance of Deviance," *Law*

and Society Review 32(1998): 777-804; Michael Reisig and Roger Parks, "Experience, Quality of Life, and Neighborhood Context," *Justice Quarterly* 17(2000): 607-629; Cao, Liqun, James Frank, and Francis T. Cullen. "Race, community context and confidence in the police." *American Journal of Police* 15.1 (1996): 3-22.

[53] Dennis P. Rosenbaum, et al. "Attitudes toward the police: The effects of direct and vicarious experience," *Police Quarterly* 8.3 (2005): 343-365.

[54] Chris L. Gibson, Samuel Walker, Wesley G. Jennings, and J. Mitchell Miller, "The Impact of Traffic Stops on Calling the Police for Help," *Criminal Justice Policy Review* 21.2 (2010): 139-159. They measure calls for help as a "behavioral indicators of citizens' confidence and trust in the police." The strong relationship between an involuntary stop and later calling on the police for assistance or to report neighborhood issues did not depend on race. Moreover, greater frequency of being stopped amplified the effect.

[55] Weitzer and Brunson, "Strategic Responses to the Police," 241.

[56] Stoudt, Fine, and Fox, "Growing up Policed," 1361.

[57] Weitzer and Brunson, "Strategic Responses to the Police," 251.

[58] "'You know, it's just so difficult to get to the subway, I just stay in the house.'" Quoted in "Suspect Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling in New York City: A panel discussion with Darius Charney, Jesus Gonzalez, Davide Kennedy, Noel Leader, and Robert Perry," *CUNY Law Review* (2010-11): 57-104. See also Weitzer and Brunson, "Strategic Responses to the Police."

[59] Stoudt, Fine, and Fox, "Growing up Policed"; Weitzer and Brunson, "Strategic Responses to the Police."

[60] Patrick J. Carr, Laura Napolitano, and Jessica Keating, "We Never Call the Cops and Here is Why: a Qualitative Examination of Legal Cynicism in Three Philadelphia Neighborhoods," *Criminology* 45.2(2007): 445-480, 456-7.

[61] Joe Soss, "Making Clients and Citizens: Welfare Policy as a Source of Status, Belief, and Action," in *Deserving* and Entitled: Social Constructions and Public Policy, ed. A. Schneider and H. Ingram (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

[62] Cathy J. Cohen, *Democracy Remixed: Black Youth and the Future of American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 195-6.

[63] Lerman, Amy E. The Modern Prison Paradox. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. Vesla Weaver and Amy Lerman, "Political Consequences of the Carceral State," *American Political Science Review* 104.4 (2010): 817-833.

[64] Vesla Weaver and Amy Lerman, "Political Consequences of the Carceral State," *American Political Science Review* 104.4 (2010): 817-833.

[65] New York Civil Liberties Union, Stop-and-Frisk Data. Accessed online: http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data

[66] Rudolf, John. 5/16/2012. Stop and Frisk Lawsuit Gains Class-Action Status, Judge Slams NYPD Over Policy. Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/16/stop-and-frisk-nypd_n_1522733.html

[67] There were X census block groups with zero residential population and X block groups where there was no information on police stops. We also exclude areas like Riker's Island and islands in Jamaica Bay.

[68] Delores Jones-Brown, Jaspreet Gill, Jennifer Trone, "Stop, Question & Frisk Policing Practices in New York City: A Primer," Center on Race, Crime and Justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, March 2010.

[69] Gelman, Andrew, Jeffrey Fagan, and Alex Kiss. "An analysis of the New York City Police Department's "stop-and-frisk" policy in the context of claims of racial bias." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 102.479 (2007): 813-823.

[70] Tom Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan, "The Impact of Stop and Frisk Policies upon Police Legitimacy," in *Key Issues in the Police Use of Pedestrian Stops and Searches: Discussion Papers from an Urban Institute Roundtable*, Nancy La Vigne, Pamela Lachman, Andrea Matthews, S. Rebecca Neusteter, 35. August 2012. Urban Institute Justice Policy Center Research Papers.

[71] Jeffrey Fagan, Tom Tyler, and Tracey Meares, "Street Stops and Police Legitimacy in New York," Unpublished Paper, 8.

[72] This method is also used in other research studies. See Gelman, Fagan, and Kiss, "An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's 'stop-and-frisk' policy"; Roh and Robinson, "A Geographic Approach to Racial Profiling."

[73] Our data also include the reason an officer provides for having initiated a Terry stop. This is important, as it may be that the concentration of stops plays a smaller role than the *kind* of stops. Given earlier studies that find it is subjective perceptions of criminal justice interactions, rather than the mere fact of contact, which drives an erosion of legitimacy, we expect that the basis of stops may play as large a role as the simple concentration of police stops. In the analyses that follow, we therefore pay particular attention to the share of stops that were motivated by police believing that the person made "furtive movements," wore clothes commonly used in a crime, or whose mere presence in a high crime area made them suspicious. Particularly in stops that do not lead to a finding of wrongdoing,

these kinds of stop justifications may be interpreted by the subject as dubious and vague; they may feel unfairly targeted and particularly resentful. Likewise, onlookers may perceive the police as having little justification for making the stop, instead approaching someone only because of their appearance or location. Indeed, such slippery rationales for stops are common – fully 51 percent of all police-initiated contact in our data were initiated because the person made a "furtive movement," rather than solely because they fit the description of a particular crime suspect in an ongoing investigation or were witnessed in the commission of a crime. Similarly, in almost 60 percent of stops, a criterion given by police was that the subject was walking in an area of high crime incidence. Previous analyses have found that a significant share of stops in New York City (as high as 14 percent) were based on rationales that did not meet the "reasonable suspicion" standard.[73]

[75] Steven Johnson, "What A Hundred Million Calls to 311 Reveal About New York," *Wired*, November 1, 2010. This article notes a 2008 customer satisfaction survey that "compared 311's popularity to other call centers in both the public and private sectors. 311 finished first, barely edging out hotel and retail performance but beating other government call centers, like the IRS's, by a mile."

[76] Johnson, "What A Hundred Million Calls."

[77] Ben Berkowitz, CEO of SeeClickFix quoted in Johnson, "What A Hundred Million Calls."

[78] Fleming, *Call 311,* 12.

[79] 129

[80] Koa Beck, "311: The Agency That Never Sleeps," Available at: www.destinationcrm.com. Last Accessed: October 8, 2012.

[81] Melanie Grayce West, "Call by Call, the City Emerges," *Wall Street Journal*, July 10, 2010.

[82] Pew Charitable Trusts, "A Work In Progress," 12.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Only calls that result in a service request are entered into the 311 system. Calls by city residents seeking information are not included.

[85] Fleming, *Call 311.*

[86] The Spatial Information Lab at Columbia University found that when Manhattan was excluded, neighborhoods with a higher share of minorities and greater disadvantage were less likely to complain about missed trash pickup than less diverse, more affluent areas. Sarah Williams and Nick Klein, "New York City Department of Sanitation (DSNY) 311 Complaint Spatial Analysis Assessment," Spatial Information Design Lab, Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture, Planning and Preservation, November 2007.

[87] New York City Department of City Planning, *New York City Police Precincts with 2008 Crime Data*, 2009.

[88] Al Baker, "City Police Stop Whites Equally But Frisk Them Less, a Study Finds," *New York Times*, Nov. 21, 2007.

[89] Robert Sampson, *Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).

[90] For a critique, see Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, "Winner Take All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States," *Politics & Society* 38.2 (2010): 152-204.

[92] Elijah Anderson, *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); Weitzer and Brunson, "Strategic Responses to the Police."

[93] Reisig and Parks, "Experience, Quality of Life, and Neighborhood Context;" Sampson and Bartusch, "Legal Cynicism and Subcultural Tolerance of Deviance."

[94] Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, "The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing," *Law & Society Review* 37.3 (2003): 513-548.